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Abstract 
This paper uses the abolition of children’s doctor-visit co-payments effective since April 
2009 as a natural experiment to estimate the effect of those co-payments on the number of 
doctor visits made by children. As the policy change involved only children, we are able 
to use the adult part of the population as a control group in a difference-in-difference 
estimation. The paper approximates the number of doctor visits by consumption of pre-
scription drugs, as visiting a doctor is the only way to obtain a prescription. Using three 
different pre-reform periods (January, February, and March 2009) and two post-reform 
periods (April and May 2009) the estimates reveal no overall effect of doctor-visit co- 
-payments on the number of children’s doctor visits. Less convincingly and more tenta-
tively, the estimates suggest a strategic shift of children’s doctor visits away from the last 
pre-reform toward the first post-reform month. 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of regulatory co-payments in Czech health care in January 
2008 was one of the biggest policy changes in this sector in recent decades. The poli-
cy change received wide media attention and initiated a fierce public and political 
debate. Regarding the impact of the reform, the official position of the Ministry of 
Health is that co-payments fulfill their role in limiting the overuse of medical serv-
ices and prescription drugs (see Ministry of Health of the CR, 2008b,c, 2009, press 
releases). 
One problem with the evidence presented by the ministry is that it is based on 
a time-series-like comparison of data from the pre- and post-reform periods. As a re-
sult, the presented changes may have been driven by other factors and erroneously 
ascribed as reform effects. Claiming that the extensive  changes in health service 
utilization observed during 2008 were driven by factors unrelated to the  reform 
would probably be taking this argument too far. On the other hand, it is unlikely that 
all the changes were driven by the reform. 
Another perspective we lack in the discussion is the effect of the reform on 
different parts of the population. The main rationale for the co-payments was to limit 
overuse in the health care sector. However, the extent of overuse is likely to be mini-
mal for certain groups of people and any decrease in health service utilization is 
likely to be detrimental to their health. Despite the fact that there is little evidence to 
support this claim, we think that children are a prime example of such a group. 
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Those two observations motivate our research. We investigate the effect of 
the doctor-visit co-payment exemption for children introduced in April 2009 on 
children’s doctor visits. As the change did not affect the adult population we are able 
to use adults as a natural control group against which we measure changes in the uti-
lization of health services by children. That is, using difference-in-difference (DD) 
methodology we are able to filter out general time trends potentially confounding 
results based on time-series estimation methods. 
As data about the number of children and adult doctor visits are not readily 
available, we proxy doctor visits by prescription drug consumption. As a doctor visit 
is a precondition for obtaining a prescription, we estimate the impact of the children’s 
doctor-visit co-payment exemption on children’s drug consumption, which allows us 
to draw conclusions regarding children’s doctor visits. 
To preview our results, we find no evidence of an impact of doctor-visit co- 
-payments on children’s doctor visits. This suggests that the  original introduction   
of the  co-payments had no detrimental effect on children’s health outcomes. On 
the other hand, we find evidence of a transitory strategic timing effect. The amend-
ment to the law regulating co-payments was signed by the president on February 18, 
2009. This made it certain that the change would indeed take place. What our data 
show then is a statistically significant decrease in children’s doctor visits in the pe-
riod immediately preceding the policy change. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We survey the existing literature 
on the effects of co-payments on demand for health care services in the next section. 
Section 3 describes our data and methodology. We present the estimation results and 
robustness checks in sections 4 and 5, respectively, while section 6 concludes. 
Before proceeding, we would like to comment on the terminology used in this 
paper. We use the terms co-payments, fees, and charges to denote the regulatory co- 
-payments introduced in the Czech Republic in 2008 for doctor visits, prescription 
drugs, and some other services at a fixed amount CZK 30 (approximately €1). We do 
not have in mind other payments patients make, such as those for certain admin-
istrative doctor services or for covering the difference between the price of a drug 
and the amount covered by the public system. 
2. Literature Survey 
The literature investigating the effects of co-payments on the use of medical 
services is not very voluminous. We survey here studies related to our work either 
geographically (the European, not the US, experience) or topically (studies dealing 
with children or prescription drugs) and refer the reader to Zweifel and Manning (2000) 
for an extensive survey of the literature. 
Two studies investigate the German experience with co-payments. First, Winkel-
mann (2004) estimates the effect of the 1997 increase in prescription drug co-pay-
ments on the number of doctor visits. The estimates show that the number of doctor 
visits fell by 10% as a result of a 200% increase in prescription drug co-payments. 
Another study – by Augurzky, Bauer, and Schaffner (2006) – investigates the effect 
of the introduction of a €10 doctor-visit co-payment in 2004 on the number of doctor 
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Both German studies employ DD methodology using children, exempt from 
co-payments in both reforms, as a control group. Consequently, their treatment group 
is the adult part of the population. Moreover, Winkelmann (2004) uses people with 
private insurance and low-income people, exempt from the co-payments, as addition-
al controls. 
Another set of studies comes from the UK and investigates the impact of pre-
scription drug fees introduced in 1968 on drug utilization. In this respect, O’Brien 
(1989) investigates data from the 1969–1986 period and Hughes and McGuire (1995) 
from the 1969–1992 period. Both studies use time-series regression due to a lack of 
available controls and estimate the elasticity of demand for drugs to be -0.33 and  
-0.37, respectively. 
Besides geographically related results, there is a series of studies using data 
from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) focusing on children and pre-
scription drugs. The HIE, conducted in the mid-1970s in the US, was a controlled 
randomized experiment designed to investigate the effect of cost-sharing on demand 
for health care services. Several thousand subjects were assigned to groups with dif-
ferent co-insurance rates (0, 25, 50, 95) and data were collected on their utilization of 
health care services and health outcomes (see Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, 
and Leibowitz, 1987, and Gruber, 2006, for an overview of methodology and re-
sults). 
Using the HIE data, Leibowitz, Manning, Keeler, Duan, Lohr, and Newhouse 
(1985) investigate the effect of health insurance generosity on the demand for health 
care by children. The results show that demand for outpatient care is responsive to 
health insurance generosity, with children in more generous plans consuming more 
outpatient services. On the other hand, no effect on inpatient care demand was found. 
Leibowitz, Manning, and Newhouse (1985) present the  results of the  same 
experiment for prescription drugs, with results similar to those for outpatient care, 
i.e., higher demand for drugs by subjects in more generous health insurance plans. 
Finally, Manning, Bailit, Benjamin, and Newhouse (1986) present the HIE re-
sults for dental care. What is interesting about this study is that it explicitly tracks 
the effects of the experiment in its different years. The results suggest the presence of 
a strategic timing effect in demand for dental care. In the first year of the experiment, 
the demand for dental care was significantly higher than in the second year. But more 
importantly, there was a significant increase in the demand for dental care in the last 
year of the experiment. 
Overall, none of the studies in the HIE explicitly uses DD methodology. In-
stead, they compare the means of the collected data. On the other hand, this amounts 
to DD estimation, as the HIE was a randomized experiment, so that there are no ex- 
-ante systematic differences between groups with different health insurance plans. 
None of the studies mentioned above uses data about drug consumption to 
proxy for the number of doctor visits as this paper does. The German studies use 
a German socio-economic panel which tracks the number of doctor visits. The UK 
studies investigate drug consumption in first place, and the HIE, by design, produced 
very detailed data about health care utilization. 
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, the relationship between the generos-
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health care utilization is a  positive one (for a  formal treatment, see Zweifel and 
Manning, 2000, section 5.1). With the claim that more generous health care insur-
ance increases health care utilization not controversial, the empirical literature just 
discussed essentially tries to estimate the strength of this relationship. 
3. Reform, Data, and Methodology 
In this section we describe the  reform under investigation in more detail, 
describe the construction of our data used in the estimation below, and explain 
the methodology used. 
Originally, public health care sector co-payments were introduced in Janu- 
ary 2008 as a measure to limit wasteful utilization of health care. Only minor groups 
were exempt, namely, people receiving low-income support benefits, children in fos-
ter homes, people in court-ordered treatment, and people with infectious diseases. 
The co-payments were set to CZK 30 (€1) per doctor visit and prescription item, 
CZK 60 (€2) per day in hospital care, and CZK 90 (€3) per visit to the emergency 
services. An annual limit on co-payments of CZK 5,000 (€170) was introduced at 
the same time (see Ministry of Health of the CR, 2008a, for more details). A few 
minor changes were made in August 2008. 
The reform we investigate is the change to the co-payment scheme describ- 
ed above effective since April 2009. The first change revoked doctor-visit co-pay- 
ments for children. The second change decreased the annual limit for co-payments to 
CZK 2,500 (€85) for children and people over 65. Finally, the third change limited 
prescription co-payments to instances where the patient supplementary payment is 
less than CZK  30, with the  supplementary payment being the  difference between 
the price of a drug and the amount covered by the public system. 
It is the effect of the first change that we investigate. Regarding the second 
change, we are unable to estimate its effect, which in itself is likely to be limited to 
a small fraction of society. For example, in 2008 during the first six months of the new 
system only 1,306 people reached the co-payment limit (Ministry of Health of the CR, 
2008b), which constitutes approximately 0.01% of the Czech population. Regarding 
the third change, we are unable to estimate its impact either, as it affected the whole 
population across the board. On the other hand, as the discussion of the methodology 
below will make clear, the third change cannot possibly confound our results. 
To fully understand the impact of the reform it is instructive to know the tim-
ing of its codification. The original, more generous version was approved by the Cham-
ber of Deputies (lower house) on December 19, 2008 and sent to the Senate (upper 
house). The Senate approved a less generous version and sent it back to the Chamber 
of Deputies on January 28, 2009. The  less generous version was then passed by 
the Chamber of Deputies on February 11, 2009, and was signed by the president on 
February 18, 2009. By then it had become clear that the changes envisioned in the less 
generous version would indeed become reality. On the other hand, given the politi-
cal salience of the issue, the nature of the changes was hard to predict until the final 
signing. 
To investigate the effect of the co-payment exemption for children on their 
doctor visits, we use data on prescription drug consumption. Under the assumption 
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Figure 1  Percentage of Drugs with Given Child Consumption Shares 
                               
 
the reform, data on prescription drug consumption are a good proxy for the number 
of doctor visits. Notice also that we need this probability to stay fixed over the period 
we study, but we can allow it to vary between children and adults provided we adjust 
the data accordingly. 
The original data we use to construct our dataset contains information from 
over 14,000 prescriptions taken out in a single Prague pharmacy in the period Janu-
ary 5, 2009 to May 31, 2009 (we call this the “observed” period). We dropped all 
observations from people who reached their 18
th birthday in the observed period, as it 
is not clear whether they should count as children or adults in our study. 
The use of data from a single pharmacy immediately raises two issues with 
our methodology. The first issue is the external validity of our results. While we are 
aware of the problem, there is nothing we can do about it, as a larger sample of data 
is simply not available. At the same time, we are not aware of any characteristic of 
the pharmacy (location, being part of distribution channel, being a chain pharmacy, 
opening hours) which would make it in any sense special. 
The second issue is the fact that several regional governments were paying 
prescription co-payments in selected pharmacies on behalf of their citizens during 
the observed period. This, however, should not compromise our results, as it took 
place mainly in Central Bohemia and several other parts of the Czech Republic, not 
in Prague. 
For each drug in the data we calculated its consumption over the whole ob-
served period by children on the one hand and by adults on the other. Subsequently, 
we label all drugs with a child consumption share of above 0.217 as children’s drugs 
and all drugs with an  adult consumption share of above 0.783 as adult drugs. 
The former constitutes our treatment group and the latter our control group. 
The rationale behind the  cut-off is the  following. The  ratio of children to 
the adult population in the Czech Republic is 1:4.6 (Czech Statistical Office, 2009). 
Hence, drugs prescribed equally to children and adults will have a child consumption 
share equal to  217 . 0
6 . 4
1
    and an adult consumption share equal to  783 . 0
6 . 4
1
1     . Fig-
ure 1 shows a histogram of the numbers of drugs with given child consumption shares. 
What Figure 1 shows is that most of the drugs in our sample are prescribed 
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Table 1  Number of Prescriptions 
 January  February  March  April  May  total 
children 331  342  301  377  333  1684 
adults 2590  2480  2551  2789  2676  13086 
 
using data from the pre- and post-reform periods only. Overall, approximately 5% of 
the drugs display a non-stable classification into child and adult ones, with rarely pre-
scribed drugs with low consumption being the most problematic. For this reason, in 
some specifications below we use a different cut-off for the classification. This more 
demanding classification labels as child (adult) drugs those with a ratio of child (adult) 
consumption of above 0.95. With this cut-off, none of the drugs switches from being 
an adult drug to being a child drug or vice versa, based on the pre- and post-reform 
period data. 
Next, we drop all observations with adult drugs going to children and vice 
versa so that the resulting data include only adult drugs consumed by adults and child 
drugs consumed by children. To proceed, we split the data into five periods: Janu- 
ary 5 to February 1, February 2 to March 1, March 2 to March 29, April 6 to May 3, 
and May 4 to May 31, which we loosely refer to below as January, February, March, 
April, and May. The first three constitute pre-reform periods, while the last two con-
stitute post-reform periods. Notice also that all the periods are four weeks long. 
We further drop the first Friday, the second Monday, and the last Friday from 
each period, as they correspond, in the appropriate month, to public holidays in 
the Czech Republic (Easter, Labor Day, and Victory Day). 
Also, we decided to exclude data from the reform week in order to avoid count-
ing prescriptions issued in the  pre-reform period as post-reform ones. We do not 
observe the date when a given prescription was issued by a doctor, but only the date 
when it was taken out. As the majority of prescriptions are collected on the issuance 
day or one day later, omitting the reform week from the data should minimize 
the risk of this misallocation. 
After all the aforementioned adjustments, the resulting dataset contains more 
than 14,000 prescriptions. Table 1 shows the number of prescriptions collected by 
children and adults in the five periods. 
Even at this preliminary stage, the number of prescriptions collected by chil-
dren and adults can be used to calculate the DD estimate of the effect of the reform 
on the number of children’s doctor visits. For example, using January as the pre- 
-reform period and April as the  post-reform period (and using the  population 
adjustment explained below) the DD estimate of the policy change effect is an in-
crease in the number of children’s prescriptions of 12.65. Using the same post-reform 
month and February and March as the pre-reform periods gives -16.78 and 36.12, 
respectively. 
The main drawback of this method is that it does not allow us to calculate 
the statistical significance of the results. And with the three estimates varying in sign 
(the same applies when May is taken as the post-reform period), it is hard to draw 
any firm conclusion. For this reason we use data about drug consumption in the re-
mainder of the paper. 64                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 1 
Figure 2  Percentage of Drugs with Given Overall Demand 
                         
 
To derive the dataset used for the estimation, we calculated demand for every 
drug for every period. The  resulting dataset contains observations for 1,719  adult 
drugs and 207 child drugs. For legal reasons, all the data work was done on the com-
puter system of the said pharmacy and the resulting dataset is devoid of any personal 
details. 
As said, the dataset contains information about demand for over 1,900 dif-
ferent drugs, with the demand divided into five different periods. Overall, the de-
mand for individual drugs is not large, as Figure 2 shows. 
The histogram in Figure 2 shows the percentage of drugs with given overall 
demand in the  observed period, with the  last column summarizing all drugs with 
demand above 100 packs. Most of the drugs (75%) have demand lower than 20 packs 
and only 2.75% of the drugs have demand higher than 100 packs, with the maximum 
demand being 530. 
Notice that the rather low demand raises no problem for the estimation meth-
odology we use. Nevertheless, to be sure that our results are not being driven by rare-
ly prescribed drugs, another dependent variable we use below drops all drugs with 
zero consumption in any of the months, effectively constraining the dataset to drugs 
with consumption of at least five packs in the observed period. 
To estimate effect of the reform we use the standard DD strategy introduced 
originally by Ashenfelter (1978). More formally, we estimate a model of the form 
it it it it it ref post T dem H G F E D        
where i’s denote the different drugs, t denotes the pre- and post-reform periods, dem 
denotes consumption of (demand for) a given drug, T is a treatment group dummy, 
post is a post-reform dummy, ref = T * post, and H  is a random error. The effect of 
the reform is then given by the estimate of į. 
For the estimation strategy to be valid, we need two assumptions to be satis-
fied. First, we need the composition of the control and treatment groups to remain 
similar over the observed period. This assumption is trivially satisfied, as we are 
using panel instead of repeated cross-section data. 
Second, we need any general trend to affect both the control and treatment 
groups in a similar way. Indeed, this assumption is often violated in DD studies, an ob-
servation made by Ashenfelter (1978), owing either to behavioral changes of eco-Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 1                                           65 
nomic agents before the reform or to selection bias. For this reason we decided to use 
three pre-reform periods, which allows us to test the assumption of equal trends, if 
only during the pre-reform period. 
Finally, notice that even with a general trend affecting both groups equally, 
we are running a risk of this general trend confounding our results due to the fact that 
the adult and child populations are of different size. By way of example, consider 
a flu epidemic which infects half of the population and each infected person is pre-
scribed a single drug. Then the consumption of this drug increases in proportion to 
the population, but considerably more for the adult population. This is due to the me-
chanical effect of the adult population being larger than the child population. For this 
reason, in all the  specifications below we divide demand for adult drugs by 4.6, 
which is the ratio of adults to children in the Czech population. 
The effect of a different probability of a doctor visit generating a prescription 
for children and adults is similar to the effect of different population sizes. For this 
reason, our population adjustment further multiplies the adult drug consumption data 
by 0.77, which is a ratio of 0.74 to 0.96, where the former is probability of a child’s 
doctor visit generating a prescription and the latter is the same probability for adults.
1  
As a final adjustment to the data we multiply adult drug consumption by 0.60, 
which is a ratio of 1.48 to 2.45, where the former is the average number of packs per 
child prescription and the latter is the same for adult prescriptions in our dataset. To 
avoid cumbersome repetition of the full explanation of the adjustments, we simply 
call it population adjustment. 
4. Results 
Table 2 shows the results of our estimations using three different pre-reform pe-
riods (January, February, and March) and three different dependent variables. The first 
dependent variable is simply consumption of the given drug. For the second depend-
ent variable we drop all the drugs with zero consumption in any of the pre- or post- 
-reform months. Finally, the third dependent variable uses the more demanding 
criterion discussed above in order for a drug to be labeled as either a child or adult 
one, dropping the rest of the data. 
What the estimates of ref clearly show for all three dependent variables is no re-
form effect when January or February is taken as the pre-reform period. On the other 
hand, when March is taken as the pre-reform period the estimates are positive and 
statistically significant for two out of the three dependent variables. 
We read this as an example of the “Ashenfelter dip” identified by Ashenfelter 
(1978). His study tries to estimate the effect of government training programs on 
a participant’s subsequent income by comparing it to pre-enrolment income. What 
Ashenfelter noticed is that there is a significant dip in income immediately prior to 
enrolment. In other words, those who lost their job are more likely to self-select into 
training programs. As a result of the self-selection, DD estimation using pre-enrol-
ment income from a period close to the enrolment date will overestimate the effect of 
the training programs. 
1 The data are based on 2008 statistics compiled by the Czech Ministry of Health using information from
all insurance companies operating in the Czech Republic. The data have not been officially published and 
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In our case, we read the estimates as showing a strategic timing effect. By 
mid-February it became clear that starting in April children would be exempt from 
doctor-visit co-payments. Consequently, some of the doctor visits were postponed, 
which caused them to drop in March and surge in April. Indeed, the results from 
the test of the equal trends assumption below confirm this interpretation. 
One interesting question is how the  estimated strategic changes in con-
sumption of child drugs translate to children’s doctor visits. A simple back-of-the- 
-envelope calculation allows us to do this. In the data, the average consumption of 
child drugs in March and April is 1.56 and 2.19 packets, respectively. For the es-
timate of the reform effect to be zero those numbers would have to be 1.87 and 1.89, 
respectively. Furthermore, in our data each child prescription has approximately 1.48 
drug packets and we know each child doctor visit generates 0.74 prescriptions. 
The visit-to-packet “exchange” rate is thus 0.91 visits per packet. Using 
the March data, this translates to 1.42 actual visits and 1.70 visits that would have 
been made without the strategic shift, or a 16% decrease. Using the estimate for our 
second dependent variable, which drops drugs with zero consumption, would give 
a 17% decrease. As we explain below, this estimate most probably overestimates 
the true extent of visit shifting due to other reform changes which took place. 
5. Robustness Checks 
We now want to discuss the robustness of our findings. First and foremost, we 
tested the equal trends assumption. To test the assumption for, say, January and Feb-
ruary, one constructs a fictitious reform effective in February and then tries to es-
timate its impact using standard DD estimation. If the trends in consumption of adult 
and child drugs are the same between the two months, the fictitious reform should 
have no impact. 
Table 3 shows the results. The first three columns show the test of the equal 
trends hypothesis for January versus February, while the remaining columns test Jan-
uary versus March and February versus March. Focusing on the January-versus-Feb-
ruary test, none of the  dependent variables gives a  significant estimate of the  fic-
titious reform effect. On the other hand, the results for the January-versus-March and 
February-versus-March tests clearly violate the  equal trends assumption. This fits 
neatly with the strategic shifting explanation discussed above. Given the March de-
crease in consumption of child drugs, comparing January or February to March 
should yield a statistically significant and negative estimate of the fictitious reform. 
For obvious reasons we are not able to test the equal trends assumption using 
pre- and post-reform months, when we would indeed like the assumption to be sat-
isfied. This raises the  issue of factors that influence the  adult and child parts of 
population in a different way potentially confounding our results. 
One such possible factor is allergies, a disease with much higher prevalence 
among children, combined with spring as the beginning of the pollen season. How-
ever, even a casual look at any pollen calendar shows that allergies are not likely to 
be behind our results, as pollen activity can explain the increase observed between 
March and April, not the decrease observed between February and March, in the num-
ber of children’s doctor visits.  
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Another factor influencing adults and children differently is secondary school 
admission tests. Those are likely to induce a short-term shift in children’s doctor 
visits in time. Although we are not able to adjust for this effect in the data, we believe 
it does not lie behind our results, as the magnitude of the shift is likely to be days. 
Furthermore, in the Czech Republic the period for admission tests is set centrally and 
in 2009 ran from April 22 to May 7. In other words, it has a considerable overlap 
with our post-reform period. 
Yet another criticism of the results is that if the strategic timing effect away 
from March toward April is indeed true, then our April data overestimate true child 
drug consumption. This then implies that the estimates of the reform effect using 
January and February as the pre-reform periods are likely to overestimate the true 
reform effect. We regard this as a valid objection, but are unable to filter out this 
effect. At the  same time, given that the  estimates using January and February as 
the pre-reform periods suggest no reform effect, correcting for the overestimate can 
at best turn the estimates into negative ones, which would be a rather puzzling result. 
Next, we conducted a series of further robustness checks. First, our population 
adjustment operates on the adult data. As an alternative, we experimented with ad-
justment operating on child drug consumption. Second, we used May as the post-re-
form period. Third, we tried to account for the fact that our dependent variable takes 
on integer values only, making use of OLS estimation potentially inappropriate. For 
this reason, we re-estimated the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 using count data 
models. Specifically, we experimented with Poisson and negative binomial models 
(see Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, chapter 17, for a discussion). In all the cases de-
scribed, the results are very similar to those already presented and are not reported 
for the sake of space. 
Another issue with our estimates is the possible confounding effect of the third 
reform change. Recall that this change specifies that prescription co-payments must 
be paid only in cases where the patient supplementary payment is less than CZK 30. 
The effect of this change is, conditional on a doctor visit, an increase in the prob-
ability of a doctor visit leading to a prescription. 
However, this violates our assumption that a doctor visit leads to a prescrip-
tion with a fixed probability and makes the correspondence between drug consump-
tion and doctor visits much looser. However, note that we can allow the probability 
not only to vary between children and adults, but also to vary across periods provided 
the change is the same for children and adults. And as the third reform change in-
creased the probability of a doctor visit generating a prescription for both groups, we 
think it does not lie behind our results. This also shows the importance of the popu-
lation adjustment, as the effect of the third change is similar to the effect in the flu 
example discussed above. 
Notice also that any potential bias the third change introduces is likely to lead 
to an overestimate of the effect of the reform. Given, then, that we find no effect of 
the reform overall, this is reassuring. This is also why we think the back-of-the-en-
velope calculation of the extent of the strategic March-to-April shift in doctor visits is 
an upper bound on any true extent of this shift. 
Another possible change induced by the third reform change is substitution 
towards more expensive drugs. While likely, this does not seem to compromise our  
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results provided the substitution is towards more expensive drugs of the same (child/ 
/adult) type. Nevertheless, the possibility of price-induced substitution reveals a draw-
back of the methodology used, as it does not include prices of drugs in the regression 
estimation. There are two reasons for this. First, for 70% of the drugs in our data 
the price is zero, as they are covered fully by the public health system. Second, al-
though the prices change from the pre- to post-reform period, the change does not 
differ for children and adults. 
However, to be sure that the results presented are not driven by the omission 
of prices, we re-estimated the regressions above with a price variable. The estimates 
of this richer model, which we do not present for the sake of space, show that the ef-
fect of prices is in general not significant and does not change the results presented. 
Overall, the third reform change seems not to lie behind the results presented, 
as it influenced the whole population, something that the DD methodology is de-
signed to deal with. On the other hand, the first reform change influenced only children, 
making our results vulnerable to scenarios that include some reform effect not ob-
served in our data. One such objection is that with doctor-visit co-payments, patients 
try to “get the most out of their visit”. After the reform, this motivation would be 
gone for children. 
Children not trying to get the most out of their doctor visit can mean, for 
example, a  decrease in the  probability of receiving a  prescription. Combined with 
an increase in the number of doctor visits this can leave consumption of child drugs 
constant, producing the estimates presented, despite the increase in children’s doctor 
visits, i.e., despite the reform having an impact. 
Despite the fact that with the current data we are not able to test this inter-
pretation, we think that getting the most out of one’s visit would manifest itself also in 
a decrease in the number of packs prescribed per child prescription after the reform. 
To test this hypothesis, we calculated the average number of packs per child prescrip-
tion before and after the reform and tested a null of no difference against an alter-
native of the average being lower after the reform. The p-value of the standard t-test 
is 0.99, strongly rejecting the alternative (the average is in fact slightly larger after 
the reform). 
Yet another potential confounding factor is the one-week spring vacation that 
children have. This falls into the last week of February for Prague districts 1 through 5 
and the first week of March for Prague districts 6 through 10. It is not, however, clear 
how this influences child drug consumption and doctor visits. On the one hand, a num-
ber of children probably leave Prague. On the other hand, those remaining indulge in 
out-of-school activities with a potentially increased probability of requiring medical 
attention. 
Also, given the rather high mobility of people within Prague it is likely that 
any considerable vacation effect would show up in both February and March. Thus 
explaining the  March drop in child drug consumption as a  vacation effect, there 
would have to be a comparable effect in February. This would translate to a positive 
estimate of the reform effect with February as the pre-reform period in Table 2. Fur-
thermore, it would translate to a negative estimate of the fictitious reform in the equal 
trends assumption test comparing January and February in Table 3. However, the es-
timates do not show such an effect.  
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Table 4  Further Estimation of Shifting Hypothesis 
dependent  variable  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
comparison months  one week around reform  three weeks around reform 
constant  0.22 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.68 0.42 
  (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** 
T 1.07 2.02 1.15 1.66 2.85 1.82 
  (0.15)*** (0.28)*** (0.30)*** (0.21)*** (0.34)*** (0.36)*** 
post 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 
  (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.01)  (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.01) 
ref 0.87 0.61 1.67 0.76 0.80 1.22 
 (0.51)*  (0.39)  (1.31)  (0.38)**  (0.43)*  (0.98) 
N 1756 614  1474 2736 1394 2324 
ch/a 790/88 278/29 705/32 1229/139  631/66 1115/47 
R
2  0.23 0.68 0.19 0.31 0.53 0.27 
   
dependent variable (1)  (2)  (3) 
comparison months April vs. May 
constant 0.38 1.08 0.36 
(0.02)*** (0.06)*** (0.02)*** 
T 1.81 5.60 2.07 
(0.30)*** (0.77)*** (0.67)*** 
post -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.03  (0.01) 
ref -0.29 -0.90 -0.93 
(0.27) (0.59) (0.62) 
N 3852 942 3338 
ch/a 1719/207 430/31  1593/76 
R
2 0.21  0.55  0.17 
Notes: See Table 3. First (second) three columns: data constrained to a single week (three weeks) around reform. Last 
three columns: estimation with fictitious reform in May. 
 
To shed further light on this issue, we restricted our March data to the last 
three weeks and the April data to the first three weeks in order to avoid the con-
founding factor of the spring vacation. The results of the estimation are given Table 4 
along with a further restriction of our data to a single week around the reform. Fur-
thermore, the last three column of the table show the results of the estimation with 
a fictitious reform in May. If our shifting hypothesis is indeed correct, we should 
observe a statistically significant drop in child drug consumption between April and 
May. 
The results in Table 4 send a mixed message. In the first six columns, which 
use restriction of the data into single or three-week periods around the reform, only 
three out of the six estimates are statistically significant despite the rest coming close 
to statistical significance (p-values of 0.12, 0.20, and 0.21, respectively). 
The estimates for the fictitious reform in May given in the last three columns 
also have the correct expected sign, but come only close to being significant (p-val-
ues of 0.29, 0.13, and 0.13, respectively). Overall, we find it hard to discard the shift-
ing hypothesis altogether, despite the fact that on purely statistical grounds it should 
probably be rejected. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have tried to estimate the effect of the recent change in the structure of pub-
lic health sector co-payments on the number of doctor visits by children. The main 
goal of the co-payments has been to limit wasteful use of health sector services. How-
ever, we believe that for certain groups of the population this wasteful use is rather 
limited and any decrease in health care utilization would come at the expense of 
health outcomes. That is why we focus on children as a prime example of such 
a group. 
We are able to use an April 2009 policy change that waived children’s doctor- 
-visit co-payments as a natural experiment. As the adult part of the population did not 
experience this policy change, we use adults as a control group in the difference-in- 
-difference estimation framework. 
Using child drug consumption as a proxy for the number of children’s doctor 
visits, we find no effect of the reform. On the other hand, the data reveal a short-term 
strategic timing effect associated with the policy change. With the policy effective 
since April 2009, there is evidence of a shift in children’s doctor visits away from 
March towards April. However, we are not able to fully disentangle the potential con-
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